HB1Watch

The law being argued about

Text and citations only. What each authority means for this dispute is exactly what the courts are deciding.

Missouri constitution and statutes

• Mo. Const. art. III, § 49 — Referendum power
  Missouri's people reserve power to approve or reject by referendum acts of the General Assembly, subject to stated exceptions.
• Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(a) — Referendum exceptions and signature rules
  Congressional redistricting is not expressly listed among the referendum exceptions.
• Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(b) — Effect of referred legislation
  A referred measure takes effect when approved by the voters “and not otherwise.”
• Mo. Const. art. III, § 45 — Congressional apportionment
• RSMo § 116.120 — Secretary's petition examination authority
• RSMo § 116.130 — Random sampling / full verification
  Random sampling carries a shorter local-verification timetable; full verification can extend to the statutory summer deadline.
• RSMo § 116.150 — Certification
  Requires a certificate of sufficiency or insufficiency and provides the statutory outside deadline.
• RSMo § 116.200 — Judicial review
  Allows a citizen to seek reversal in Cole County and requires such litigation to be advanced and decided as quickly as possible.
• RSMo §§ 128.346, 128.348 — Congressional districts and historical notes
  Revisor historical notes document referendum milestones.

Federal precedents in play

• Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565 (1916)
  Referendum may be part of a state's lawmaking process for congressional redistricting.
• Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932)
  Elections Clause redistricting remains subject to the state's ordinary lawmaking process.
• Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25 (1993)
  States have primary responsibility for redistricting; federal courts ordinarily respect timely state redistricting processes.
• Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Comm'n, 576 U.S. 787 (2015)
  Supports direct-democracy mechanisms as part of state legislative power under the Elections Clause.
• Moore v. Harper, 600 U.S. 1 (2023)
  The Elections Clause does not free state legislatures from state constitutional constraints and state judicial review.
• Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006)
  Cautions federal courts about election-rule changes close to an election. Both sides can invoke “status quo” differently here: the legal status quo is the 2022 map under the Missouri Supreme Court's judgment; the practical election status quo is the HB 1 districts used in the August primary.
• Shapiro v. McManus, 577 U.S. 39 (2015)
  Bears on when a three-judge district court must be convened.
• 28 U.S.C. § 2284
  Constitutional challenges to congressional apportionment ordinarily require a three-judge district court. A single district judge has limited TRO authority but cannot perform every function reserved to the three-judge court. This may become an important appellate issue.
• Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005)
  Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
• Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281 (1970)
  Anti-Injunction Act and federal–state court interaction.
• Dataphase Systems, Inc. v. C L Systems, Inc., 640 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1981)
  Eighth Circuit preliminary-injunction framework.

Related Missouri cases

• Maggard v. State, SC101581
  Before certification and review resolved sufficiency, merely submitting the referendum did not automatically settle HB 1's status. Once SC101805 determined the petition legal, sufficient and timely, the legal consequence was that HB 1 never took effect.
• Luther v. Hoskins, SC101412
  Separate mid-decade-redistricting challenge.
• People Not Politicians v. Hoskins, WD88795
  Ballot-language litigation.
• SC101801
  Signature-related litigation that became moot after the August 4 certificate relied on constitutional grounds rather than signature insufficiency.
• Harris v. Hoskins, SC101806
  A separate initiative-petition dispute, not an HB 1 case. Relevant as administrative context only.